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International  Commodity  Markets
Coffee is an important crop for the Dominican  The model's results suggest that production
Republic, accounting on average for 11 percent  wil! decline if present pricing policies continue
of total exports by value during 1982-84.  But  - and that the decline will be much steeper if
for the last 10 years or so, coffee yields have  the ICA export quota agreement is not renewed
been low, and production and exports stagnant.  in September 1989.
Yields are poor because the trees are very old,
poorly cared for, and planted too far apart.  Tax cuts seem to be crucial if the export
quota system is not renewed.  Without a quota
If current policies for coffee continue,  and without tax cuts, real producer prices could
production and exports are likely to decline even  fall significantly - about 30 percent the first
further. The Dominican Republic could have  year and 15 to 20 percent over the following
difficulty filling its export quota under the  three years.  Under those circumstances, coffee
International Coffee Agreement (ICA).  It could  fanmers  would probably lose interest in growing
lose its export quota share and therefore its share  coffee.
of the high-priced markets.
The model suggests that if the ICA is contin-
Varangis sees the high tax on coffee exports  ued, an export-tax cut of 52 percent would
as the main disincentive to growth in coffee  produce the desired production level (to meet
production. With a small econometric model of  projected quota and nonquota export demand)
the Dominican coffee sector, he simulated the  by 2000.  If the ICA is discontinued,  the export
impact of export tax reductions under different  tax must be eliminated to achieve the same
assumptions about the operation of the ICA  production level.
export quota system.
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1.  In terms  of export  revenues,  coffee  is the second  most important
agricultural  commodity  in the Dominican  Republic. On the  average  for the
period  1976-86  coffee  exports  made  up 22%  of the  Dominican  Republic's  primary
product  exporcs.  Coffee  contributes  directly  or indirectly  to the  total  or
partial  support  of  about  700,000  people  (9.5%  of  total  population).
2.  Coffee production  in the Dominican  Republic  increased  during the
1960s  and early 1970s  but  stagnated  after  1975.  The direct  reason  for this
stagnation  was the stagnation  in the planted  area along  with the limited
renovation  and rehabilitation  of coffee  growing  areas.  Average  production
over the last 12 crop  years  was 950,000  bags 1/  with  yearly  fluctuations  of
around  30%  mainly  due  to  climatic  variability.  Neither  production  nor  exports
show an increasing  trend  (see Chart  1).  After  reaching  a peak  during  the
1977/78  crop year,  exports  declined  and stabilized  at around  530,000  bags
until the 1986/87  crop year.  Domestic  consumption  has fluctuated  between
280,000  and  305,000  bags  during  the  last  10  years  with  no clear  trend.
1/  I  bag  60  kg.CHART 1:  Dominccrn  Repubbtic
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3.  Dominican  coffee  sells  for  about  7X less  than  "Other  Milds"  1/  on the
world  market;  reflecting  primarily  the lower  quality  of the  Dominican  coffee,
which  was found  to be due to inappropriate  processing  after  harvesting. 2/
However,  better quality  Dominican  coffee  has, in the past, sold at prices
higher  than  "Other  Milds"  and  close  to or  equal  to Colombian  coffee.
4.  This  paper  .epo-ts  on the  perceived  constraints  to the  development  of
the  Dominican  Republic's  coffee  subsector  and  evaluates  the  impact  of policies
which  would contribute  to improving  its performance. The paper  is organized
as follows. Section  II presents  the  main characteristics  of the  coffee  sector
and the issues arising from its management.  Section III presents  policy
changes  recommended  to rejuvenate  the sector.  Section  IV describes  a small
econometric  model  of the  coffee  subsector  built  to  evaluate  policy  changes  and
presents  projections  of coffee  production  and exports  under  different  policy
regimes  and  different  world  market  environments.
1/ Refers  to the  International  Coffee  Organization  (ICO)  Indicator  Price  for
"Other  Milds"  which  are  primarily  coffees  produced  in  Mexico  and  Central
American  countries.
2/  A comparison  of export  unit  values  between  Dominican  coffee  and  coffees  in
the  categories  of "Other  Milds"  and  "Colombian  Milds"  is  given  in  Annex
Table  1.-4-
II.  A PROFILE  OF THE  COFFEE  SECTOR
Crop  Area and  Yields
5.  Coffee  occupies  about  157,000  b% stares  of land  and is  grown  on 71,235
farms  with an average  size  of about  2..  hectares. More specifirdlly,  94%  of
the farms are 6.3 hectares  or less and occupy  78% of the total  area under
coffee (see Annex Table 2).  Coffee growing is therefore  a  smallholder
activity  which  is present  on nearly  20%  of all  farms. Of the  total  area  under
coffee,  56,000  hectares  (or 36%) is in climatically-marginal  areas,  meaning
areas below 500 meters  of altitude. More than 50% of the coffee  trees  are
more than 50-60  years old, i.e.,  beyond  normal  useful  economic  life in most
countries,  which  is  20-25  years. The  density  of planting  is  about  1,200  trees
per  hectare  compared  to  about  3,500  in  Costa  Rica  and 2,900  in  Guatemala. The
predominant  variety  is  the  "typica",  a traditional  variety;  although  new  high-
yielding varieties are  being  introduced,  especially the  "caturra" and
"catuai".  There is no attempt to control the shade over coffee trees.
Stumping  (a pruning  practice  to  enhance  yields)  is  not carried  out.
6.  As a result  of the the above  poor management  practices,  as well as
the fact that there is no application  of fertilizers  or pesticides,  yields
typically  are  very low (by  any comparison). The  average  yield  is about  45-50
lb/tarea  1/ or 7.2-8.0  qq/ha  (quintals  per hectare). 2/  In Costa  Rica the
average  yield  is 35 qq/ha;  in El Salvador  it is 22 qq/ha  and in Honduras  16
qq/ha.  The  cross-farm  variation  in yields  is considerable--from  6.4  qq/ha  to
1/  15.92  tareas  =  1  ha.
2/  1 quintal (qq) =  100 lb =  45.36 kg.-5-
over  32  qq/ha. It  has  been  calculated  that  about  70X  of  the  farms  have  yields
of  around  6.4  qq/ha,  20X  around  12  qq/ha  and  0l  around  32-38  qq/ha.
7.  Without  renovation  or replanting  and given  continuation  of the  poor
husbandry practices on  the majority  of  farms, production  is likely to
decline. The  average  age  of trees  will  inc:ease,  yields  will  decline  further,
and as the trees get older a higher  proportion  will die.  In 1987 the
government, through the  Coffee Department  of  Secretaria  de  Estado de
Agricultura  (SEA),  began  implementation  of  a program  of rehabilitation  of the
old  orchards--the  program  of the  Presidency  (Programa  de la  Presidencia).  The
goal is to rehabilitate  around  6,200  ha each year over for the next three
years.  The program  includes  the provision  of fertilizers,  pesticides  and
seedlings  at subsidized  rates. Preliminary  data  are  expected  to be  published
soon  to show  the  results  of this  program  so  far.
Production  and  Exports
8.  As a result  of the  stagnating  crop  area  and  yields,  coffee  production
has  been  largely  stagnant  with  an  average  year-to-year  variation  of 30Z  due  to
weather influences  (see Annex Table 3).  While domestic  consumption  also
remains  stagnant,  Dominican coffee  exports  to ICO  members  have  declined.  I/
As a result,  its  share  of the  ICA  global  export  quota  has  fallen  from  1.05Z  to
0.84X  over the  1981/82-1987/88  period  (see  Table  1).  This  inability  to fill
the ICO export  quotas  is costly  in the short-term  in that coffee  sales  at
prices supported by  the  International  Coffee Agreement  are  foregone  and,  in
1/  Coffee  exports  declined  due  to  the  loss  in  the  snare  of the  global
quota. The  quota  share  may  further  decline  as  unwashed  arabicas  are
expected  to  become  even  less  desirable  in the  future.- 6 -
Table 1:  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC'S  SHARE IN THE ICA GLOBAL  COFFEE EXPORT  QUOTA
Coffee Year  X








*Quota was suspended  from February  1986 to  September  1987.
Source:  International  Coffee  Organization  (ICO).
the longer-term,  the country  is liable  to aee its export  quota  decline because
of non-fulfillment  of quota.
9.  In Annex Table 4 exports  are divided into ICA member and non-member
exports.  1/  As can be seen from this table,  exports  to non-member  countries
are non-systematic  and over the last  four years  have reached  quite low levels,
even zero.  Under the ICA quota scheme exports  to non-member  countries  can be
considered a  safety valve in times of high production and excessive stock
accumulation.
1/  Exports to non-memLers  are usuaiiy  sold at prices 20-30X  lower than those
to ICA  members.-7-
Quality  and  Processing
10.  The issues  of quality  and processing  of coffee  are interrelated  in
the Dominican  Republic.  Genetically,  the type of coffee  grown is of good
quality  and  equal  to  coff'es  grown  in  Guatemala  and  Costa  Rica--both  producing
good quality  coffees. About  two-thirds  of the  coffee-growing  area is  located
between 600 and 1,100 meters of altitude,  in areas of good rainfall  and
overall  excellent  growing  conditions. Until  recently,  there  were no serious
diseases  and pests  affecting  the coffee  plants.  Thus,  good  processing  wo; -
maintain  the inherent  qualities  of the coffee  cherries.  However,  Dominican
Republic  coffee  is  not of the  quality  standard  of similar  coffees  grown  under
similar  conditions  (thi quality  differential  is reflected  in a comparison  of
unit values  of exports,  see Annex  Table  1).  It is estimated  that  as much  as
80Z  of the  quality  defects  are  caused  by inappropriate  processing.  About  90X
of the production  is processed  by small  producers  who  neither  have the  means
nor the  know-how  to perform  the appropriate  processing. The coffee  cherries
are usually  processed  with incomplete  pulping  and washing.  Coffee  cherries
are  left to ferment  between  picking  and  pulping,  and again  after  pulping. It
is mostly  the case that  there is not enough  space  on the cement  patios  for
coffee  to dry, so that after  washing  coffee  is either  piled  up to dry--thus
contributing  to overfermentation--or  dried  on the ground  and thus acquiring
the  flavor  of mold. Washing  facilities  are seldom  of  acceptable  standard. In
the Barahona  region,  where the quality  of cherries  is very good, the dry
method (drying  without  previously  washiA.g  the depulped  coffee  cherries)  is
used which yields low quality beans.  The sorting  of coffee is not done
carefully,  and, as a result,  coffee  beans are not homogeneous  in size and- 8 -
different  qualities  of coffee  are  mixed  together. If the  coffee  cherries  are
not  sorted before pulping and pass through the same pulper, the smaller
cherries  are  not pulped  while  the  larger  ones  are  damaged.
Commercialization
11.  The  network  of coffee  marketing  can best be seen from  Chart  2.  The
government  is not involved  in coffee  buying  from  the producers. The  bulk of
coffee  for  export  is  channeled  t.irough  private  exporters,  which  handled  87%  on
average  during  the  1976/77-1985/86  period. Producer  associations  exported  an
average of lOX and producers/exporters  3%.  When ICA export  quotas  are in
effect,  the governmental  Coffee  Commission  is responsible  for  allocating  the
export  quota  between  producers/exporters,  traditional  exporters  and
associations. Currently,  the export  quota is allocated  as follows:  5Z to
traditional  exporters, 20%  to  producer associations  and  5%  to producer
exporters.
12.  The traditional  exporters  obtain  their  coffee  through  a network  of
intermediaries  who buy it from the farmers. Producer  associations  buy their
coffee  from  their  associates;  though  some  associations  extend  their  purchases
outside their  associates.  Small  producers  do not always  show interest  and
trust in joining producer associations.  They prefer to diversify their
markets  and sell  part of their  coffee  through  intermediaries  and  part  through
associations. Other growers prefer  dealing  with intermediaries  only.  The
system  of payment by producer  associations  is as follows:  as soon as the
farmer  brings  his  coffee  to the  association  he receives  a payment  equal  to the-9-
Chart  2:  NETWORK  OF COFFEE  COMMERCIALIZATION  IN  THE DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC
Domestic  and/or  International  Market
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of  Traditional  Large







Producer- 10  -
price  recommended  to the grower.  1/  At the  end of the financial  year,  the
association  distributes  part of any profits  back to its associates.  The
remainder  is held by the association. Currently,  the  share  withheld  by the
associations  is estimated  be be RD$7-10  per 100  lb of green  coffee,  which is
2-2.5X  of f.o.b.  value. The availability  of credit  is the  effective  limit  on
coffee purchases  by prodLcer associations.  By avoiding  the intermediary
network,  producer  associations  usually  manage to pay higher prices  to the
growers.  There  are times,  however,  when intermediaries  and exporters  bid  up
the prices paid to the growers for speculative  purposes--usually  on the
expectation  of increases  in international  coffee prices or of changes in
government  policies  affecting  the  coffee  subsector.
13.  Exporters'  and intermediaries'  margins  are claimed  to be excessive,
although  there are no concrete  data to substantiate  these  claims.  Table 2
presents  an attempt to quantify  these margins.  2/  From the table  three
points  can be made:  (1)  the  real  margins  fluctuated  consilerably  between  1973
and 1987; (2) the network  of intermediaries  and exporters  took  advantage  of
the  high  coffee  prices  in the  late  1970s,  and  recently  in  1986,  to  raise  their
margins;  and  (3)  in  the  last  four  years  real  margins  have  increased  as
l/  The price recommended  to the grower is an indicative  price published
periodically  by the  Secretariat  of State  for  Agriculture. This  price  is
compiled  by surveying  exporters  on what they pay for the coffee they
purchased  and it is based on the world coffee  price for "Other  Milds"
arabicas  c.i.f.  New York.
2/  In the  table  commercialization  and  industrialization  margins  are  not
separated. The  reason  is  that  while  the  f.o.b.  export  price  refers  to
green  coffee,  the  price  paid  to the  growers  refers  to parchment  coffee.
The  difference  between  the  two  prices  (under  the  column  commercialization
and  industrialization  margins)  includes  the  cost  of processing  the
parchment  coffee  into  green  coffee.- 11 -
rable  2:  ANALYSIS  OF  COFFEF  PRICES  1973-1987




World  of  Tax  Producer  Industrialization  Real
Price  /a  Export  Price  (f.o.b.)  (f.o.b.)  Price  /b  Margins  /c  Margins  /d
Year  (USS)  (USS)  (iRDS)  (iDS)  (ID$)  (RD0)  C)  R0DS)
1973  62.3  53.80  53.80  53.80  30.00  23.80  44.2  49.5
1974  65.8  63.05  63.05  63.05  30.00  33.05  52.4  60.8
1975  65.4  55.32  55.32  54.24  42.00  12.24  22.6  19.6
1976  142.8  88.08  88.08  74.83  46.00  28.83  38.5  43.0
1977  234.7  206.56  206.56  128.60  79.94  48.66  37.8  64.9
1978  162.8  151.28  151.28  137.87  68.32  69.55  50.4  88.6
1979  173.5  139.61  139.61  93.14  58.25  34.89  37.5  40.7
980  154.2  165.71  165.71  154.95  62.00  92.95  60.0  92.9
1981  128.1  103.30  103.30  98.20  66.00  32.20  32.8  30.0
1982  139.9  118.83  118.83  110.01  86.50  23.51  21.4  20.3
1983  131.6  116.75  116.75  108.71  84.00  24.71  22.7  20.5
1984  144.3  130.15  171.80  155.92  92.80  63.12  40.5  41.0
1985  146.6  123.66  244.85  207.76  119.50  88.26  42.5  41.7
1986  194.8  168.89  457.69  322.15  184.50  137.65  42.7  59.1
1987  /e  113.7  99.00  380.2  283.1  143.1  140.0  49.5  50.9
/a Price  of "Other  Mild"  arabicas,  average  c.i.f.  New  York  and  Bremen/Hamburg.
/b The  producer  price  refers  to  parchment  coffee,  while  the  export  price  refers  to  green  coffee.
/c  Calculated  as  the  percentage  of  the  f.o.b.  price  net  of  taxes.
/d The  real  margin  Is  obtained  by  deflating  the  Dominican  consumer  price  Index.
To  Estimates.
Sources: Calculations  based  on data  obtained  from  C.A.  Benito,  R.D.  Norton  and  T.  Suriel,  "Un
Analisis  Cuentitativo  del  sector  Cafetalero  Dominicano",  April  1988.- 12  -
compared  to the  early  years  of the  1980s  which  succeeded  the  coffee  price  boom
of 1976-79.
14.  The variable  nature  of commercialization  margins  makes it difficult
to establish  a unique  and reliable  producer  price  series. Coffee  is sold  by
the  farmer  in four  different  forms:  (1)  on the  tree,  with  the  purchaser  paying
for the collection  of cherries  and all the processing;  (2)  as cherries,  with
the farmer  bearing  the cost of collection  and leaving  all the processing  in
the hands  of the  purchaser;  (3)  as parchment,  with the farmer  collecting  the
cherries  and doing some of the processing;  and finally  (4)  as green  coffee
with all processing  done by the farmer.  The translation  of the different
categories  of coffee  prices  received  by growers  into  green  coffee  equivalent
prices  does  not  yield  a consistent  set  of  producer  prices.
Coffee  Prices  and  Taxes
15.  The price  paid to growers  is calculated  as follows: the  c.i.f.  spot
price  of green  coffee  in  New York is  adjusted  for freight  costs  and insurance
(US$4.50  for 100 lb) and quality (a deduction  of US$5.50  for 100 lb) and
multiplied  by the official  exchange  rate to derive  the f.o.b.  price.  The
export tax is a  progressive  ad valorem tax and is currently  applied as
follows:  up to a f.o.b.  price of RD$250/100  lb there is no tax; between
RD$250  and  RD$299  a 30%  tax is  applied;  for  a price  of RD$300  and  above  there
is a tax  of 40%.  A "voluntary"  contribution  of RD$4.08/100  lb to the  Coffee
Commission  is added to the tax.  After taxes,  the voluntary  contribution
together  with the  costs  of exportation  (around  RD$30-35/100  lb)  and  coomercial
ma-gins,  as well as other  costs,  are  subtracted  from  the  f.o.b.  price  and  the- 13 -
price  paid to the growers  is the  residual. For  example,  for  a recent  f.o.b.
price  of RD$808/100  lb. the growers  received  RD$408  (or 50.5X  of the f.o.b.
price)  while the export tax  was RD$218  (equivalent  to an average  27.5Z  tax
rate). Net  of export  charges  the  f.o.b.  price  was  RD$586.14/100  lb,  which  was
further  reduced  by a RD$35/100  lb  of export  cost  and  a RD$142.90/100  lb profit
margin as well as other costs (e.g.,  transportation)  for the  exporters  and
intermediaries.  Exporters  provide  to SEA  1/  a record  of the  prices  which  they
pay to growers.  It is claimed in some quarters  that the growers do not
receive these prices but  some  lower price.  However, the  correlation
coefficient  between  the price quoted  as paid to growers  and the world  price
for "Other  Mild"  arabicas  is 0.92,  which shows  that  prices  quoted  as paid to
growers  by exporters  reflect  world  price  movements  reasonably  well.  Table  2
provides  series  for  the  period  1973-87  for  the  prices  of "Other  Milds"  and  the
prices recommended  by SEA to be paid to growers,  as well as the implicit
export  taxes  and  marketing  costs  and  margins.
1/  SEA  stands  for  Secretaria  de Estado  de  Agricultura,  which  is  the
equivalent  of the  Department  (Ministry)  of  Agriculture.- 14  -
III.  POLICIES  TO IMPROVE  THE PERFORKANCE  OF THE COFFEE SECTOR
16.  In this section  policies  to improve  the performance  of the coffee
subsector  in the Dominican  Republic  are presented.  There are two general
areas in which improvemevns  are needed; first, in the technical  area and
second,  in  the  area  of pricing  policy.
Technical  Issues
17.  In  the  technological  area  there  is  an  obvious need  for  the
introduction  of the new, high-yielding  varieties  of coffee  trees  to provide
the  opportunity  for  higher  production;  next,  there  is need for  improvement  in
the  quality of  the  coffee beans which will only be achieved with the
establishment  of coffee  washing stations;  and finally,  there is need for
improvements  in the marketing  of coffee  via the establishment  of new  markets
and  marketing  channels.
A.  Coffee  Replanting
18.  Replanting  to replace  the  aged trees should  take  place  gradually  so
as not  to cause  serious  disruption  in  production  and  farm  income. This  can  be
done by planting  the  new  coffee  trees  under  the  existing  ones  and  maintaining
a part  of the  old  plant  until  the  new  plants  are  able  to  produce.
19.  Replanting  should  receive  priority  in areas of at least  500  meLers
elevation  (600  meters  for  the  southern  region)  in  order  to obtain  good  quality- 15  -
coffee.  Before  replanting,  good soil preparation  should  take place  and the
lay-out  of the  plantation  should  be evaluated. Replanting  need  not  be limited
to plantings  of new varieties.  Higher  yields  per  hectare  could  be obtained
from  existing  varieties  if  higher  planting  densities  are  applied. The  density
of planting should be dependent on the variety planted  and the terrain.
Planting  density  can  be as close  as 2 x 1 meters  (for  Caturra)  with  two  plants
per hole.  In this  way a density  of up to 5,000  plants  per hectare  can be
achieved.  Shade over the coffee  trees  should  be controlled. Taller  trees
that cast too much shade should  be cut.  Fertilization,  weed control  and
disease  control  should  also be implemented,  especially  now that the  disease
"leaf rust" is affecting  trees.  Finally,  each fifth to seventh  year of a
tree's  life  "stumping"  should  be  practiced  to  maintain  vigorous  yields.
B. Establishment  and  Operation  of  Coffee  Washing  Stations
20.  It has  been  estimated  that  about  80%  of the  defects  in  coffee  quality
are due  to inappropriate  processing  of the coffee cherries  by the small
growers.  Washing stations  to produce  fully-washed  coffee  are recommended
given the good genetic  quality  of the Dominican  coffee  and the premium  paid
for fully-washed  coffee in the international  market.  This would mean the
processing of  coffee cherries by  a  processing station rather than by
individual  growers.  Growers  would have to transport  their coffee  cherries
immediately  after picking to the  processing  station.  Delays in coffee
transportation,  due to poor road conditions,  would cause serious  quality
defects. Accessibility  to the stations  should  be ensured  by the  construction
of rural  roads.- 16  -
21.  As well as the  premium  paid for fully-washed  coffees,  processing  by
this  method  would  increase  production. With the  fully-washed  method  it takes
about five pounds of coffee  cherries  to produce  one pound of fully-washed
green  coffee,  whereas  under  the  current  processing  technique  in the  Dominican
Republic it takes six to seven pounds of cherries.  1/  The case for
production  of fully-washed  coffee  is  also  supported  by the  recent  world  demand
trend toward higher-quality  coffee, evidenced by  the  increase in price
differentials  between higher and  lower quality coffees. 2/  The  major
difficulties  associated  with the production  of fully-washed  coffee  are the
need for  greater  attention  by the  grower  during  harvesting.  To produce  fully-
washed coffee, coffee cherries have to have a uniform ripeness  which is
reflected  in the  color  of the  cherry. Also,  the  operation  of  washing  stations
requires  skilled  management  and  staff.
A  cost benefit  and  a cash flow  analysis  were  prepared  to  analyze  the
economies  of investment  in coffee  washing stations.  In the cost benefit
analysis,  the costs  of operation  were  divided  into  investment  and operational
costs. The  costs  of land,  buildings,  machinery  and  equipment,  transportation,
and initial operating  capital  were included  under investment  costs.  The
purchase  of coffee  cherries  for  processing,  the  maintenance  of buildings  and
1/  It can  also be  argued  that  the  system  of  washing  stations  proposed  here
can  reduce  the  risks  facing  the  grower  due,  for  example,  to  the  theft  of
his  crop  while  drying  or  damage  by rain  during  drying.
2/  The price differential  between robustas  and fully-washed  arabicas  was
around  lOX before  the first  half of 1987  and about  30X in 1988.  If one
takes into consideration  that unwashed  arabicas  are more expensive  than
robustas  but less expensive  than  washed  arabicas,  the  price  differential
in the  first  half  cf 1987  between  washed  and  unwashed  arabicas  should  have
been  less  than  lOZ  (say  around  5x)  compared  to 13-15X  for  1988.- 17  -
equipment,  the costs of packing material,  labor,  administrative  costs and
contingencies  were included  in operating  costs.  The benefit  from the  project
was the sale of washed  green coffee  at a premium  of 18% above  the price  of
unwashed  green  coffee. The  total  net benefit  from the  20-year  operation  of a
washing  station  is  calculated  to  be US$1,780,000.  The  net present  value  (NPV)
at 12% opportunity  cost of capital  is US$440,000  and the Internal  Rate of
Return  (IRR)  is 34.6%. Using  the  cash  flow  analysis,  the  cummulative  net  cash
flow after the debt service  (inflows  minus outflows  minus debt service)  is
estimated to be US$1,313,000.  1/  All calculations  were performed  at an
exchange  rate of RD$6.28 per US$.  In the analysis  above, the conversion
between cherries  and green coffee  is 4.5 to 1 versus  6 to 1 for unwashed
arabicas.
C.  Coffee  Marketing
22.  Washing  stations  to produce  fully-washed  coffee  should  be the first
step in the effort  to improve  quality. However,  the  improved  quality  coffee
has to be accorupanied  by improvements  in the marketing  system. New  markets
should  be identified  that demand  quality coffee  and are willing to pay a
premium. The European  and  Japanese  markets  have  good  prospects  for  coffee
1/  With  a 13%  premium  the  total  net  benefit  becomes  US$1,496,000,  the  NPV is
US$340,000,  the  InR  29.4%  and  the  cummulative  net  cash  flow  after  the  debt
service  is  US$1,030,000.- 18  -
imports.  1/  Even within  the  US market,  better  quality  coffee  is in greater
demand. Experience  in  other  coffee-producing  countries  has shown  that  selling
directly  to roasters  rather  than  to traders  can  also  ir.rease  profit  margins.
23.  Improvements  in quality  and improvements  in marketing  of coffee  can
contribute  to increased  coffee  export  revenues  under  the existing  ICA  export
quota  system,  even if the  quantity  produced  remains  unchanged. They  can  also
"cushion"  the impact  on  coffee  export  revenues  of  a failure  to renew  the  quota
system.  In the absence  of the quota scheme,  consuming  countries  would be
freer  to  choose  between  origins  and  good  qualities  will  receive  preference.
Pricing  Policy  Issues
24.  The government  does not exert direct  control  over producer  prices.
However,  it influences  the price  received  by the producer  in two ways: via
exchange  rate  policies  and  via  export  taxes.
A.  Coffee  Export  Taxes
25.  As shown  above,  under the present  export  tax law,  export  costs  and
marketing  margins,  the  price  received  by the  grower  is  about  50X  of the  f.o.b.
price. It is  estimated that  given  the  current and  forecast world  coffee
1/  The  World  Bank is  projecting  the  growth  rate  of European  and  Japanese
coffee  demand  to  be 1.7%  p.a.  and  4.1%  p.a.,  respectively.- 1c  -
prices,  the  adoption  of  new,  high-yielding  technologies  in coffee  cultivation-
-which  involves  higher  costs--is  not  profitable  for  the  grower. Therefore,  in
order for the higher-yielding  technology  to be adopted,  the export  tax  will
have to be reduced.  A new progressive  tax schedule  is proposed  here which
lowers  average tax rates.  Also, it is suggested  that the tax schedule  be
based  on  dollar  values  rather  than  domestic  currency.  The  latter
recommendation  is made in order to avoid  increases  in the  average  tax  levels
due  to exchange  rate  depreciation  (so-called  "bracket  creep").  1/
26.  In order to assess the effects of export tax t  ductions  on key
variables in  the coffee subsector,  a  partial equilibrium  model of  the
Dominican  coffee subsector  (described  below)  was constructed,  based on the
Akiyama-Trivedi  vintage  capital  approach.  2/  Using this  model,  the long-run
(10-year)  export  supply  elasticity  was estimated  to be 0.87.  Simulation  runs
were  made for several  export  tax  options,  assuming  that  the suggested  changes
in the export  tax schedule  will take place in 1990.  The effect  of each of
these  new export  tax  schedules  on the  key  variables  was assessed  for  the  year
2000.
1/  Calculations  performed  indicate  that  given  the  existing  tax  brackets  in
RD$  and  an f.o.b.  price  of  US$128.32,  the  average  export  tax  rate  will
increase  from  27.5X  to 31.7%  if  the  RD$  is  devalued  by 50%  against  the
US$.  In the  case  of 100%  devaluation,  the  average  export  tax  rate
increases  to 35.5%.
2/  See  T.  Akiyama,  and  P.K.  Trivedi  (1987),  "Vintage  Production  Approach  to
Perennial  Crop  Supply",  Journal  of Econometrics  (36,  pp. 133-161).- 20 -
27.  Table 3 outlines  three  options  for export tax reduction  and their
impact  on producers'  prices,  exports  and revenues.  These  three  options  are
designed  to reduce  the average  tax rate (at  an f.o.b.  price  of US$119/QQ)  by
33.3Z,  52.4%  and 68.6%.  These tax reductions,  assuming  that they are  fully
passed  to the producer,  will augment  the producer  price  by 15.1%,  23.8%  and
31.1%,  respectively.
28.  The benefits  from the export  tax reduction  are: (a)  an increase  in
the competitiveness  and profitability  of the coffee  sector  in the Dominican
Republic.  By increasing  profitability,  adoption  of the new, high-yielding
technology  should  be possible;  (b)  an increase  of production  and  exports  as a
result  of (a);  and (c)  the  increase  of foreign  exchange  earnings  as the  result
of export  expansion  by US$8.3,  US$13.0  and  US$17.0  million,  respectively,  for
the three  export  tax reduction  options. The cost for the  government  is the
reduction  of its revenues  due to coffee  taxation  by 24.5Z,  42.5%  and 60.1%
respectively. Given  that the  revenues  from export  taxation  are roughly  4-5%
of total  government  revenues,  the reducticn  in coffee  export  taxation  would
mean a  reduction in government  revenues  by  roughly 1.1%, 1.9% and 2.7%
respectively.  However, this  estimate does  not  allow  for  the  likely
possibility  that, without the suggested  improvements  :n  management,  coffee
production  could  decline.
29.  In order  to protect  real  producer  prices  from  erosion  by inflation,
the  export  tax schedule  rates  should  be deflated  by some  inflation  index;  in
effect,  to adjust  the US$ base prices  for inflation. The  deflator  proposed
here is  the  exchange  rate  adjusted  Dominican  CPI.  More  specifically,  the- 21  -
Table  3:  OPTIONS  FOR  EXPORT  TAX  iREDUCTION  AND  TiEIR  IPACT
ON  PRICES  AND  REVENUES
Current  Option  I  Option  II  Option  III
RDS  S  USS  S  USS  S  USS  $
60-70  20  60-70  10  80-100  20
250-300  30  70-80  30  70-80  20  100-120  30
Range FOB  Price  300  40  80  40  sO  30  120  40
CIF USS/qq  134  134  134  134
FOB  USS/qq  119  119  119  119
FOB  Ri)S/qq  747  747  747  747
Avorage  Tax  25.9  17.3  12.4  8.2
Tax/qq  194  129  92  61
Tax  Reductlon/qq  65  102  133
Tax  Reductlon/qq  ()  33.3  52.4  68.6
Producor  Price  (PP)  427  492  529  560
Increase  In  PP (R)S/qq)  0  65  102  133
Increase  In  PP (S)  0  15.1  23.8  31.1
Exports  (qq)  528,597  598,108  638,002  671,810
Increase  In  exports  (qq)  0  69,511  109,405  143,213
Exports  (million  of  USS)  62.9  71.2  75.9  79.9
Increase  In  Exports
(millions  of USS)  0  8.3  13.0  17.0
Tax  Revenue (millions  of  RDS)  102.5  77.4  58.9  40.9
Tax Loss  (mIllions  of  RDS)  0  25.1  43.6  61.6
Tax Loss  (5)  0  24.5  42.5  60.1
Share  of  Tax  Loss  In  Total
Government Revenue (%)  0  1.1  1.9  2.7
/a Below  this  point  of  tho  table  all levels  and  differences  refer  to  year  2000.
Sources:  Mission  estimates.
Assumptlons:  The elasticity  of  export  supply  Is  0.87.
The exchango rate  of  RD.S628/USS  In  1988.
All  calculations  are In  constant  1988 prices.- 22  -
Dominican CPI  should be divided by the RD$/US$ exchange rate (EKCH) a!,
follows:
DEFLt  =  (CpIt/CPIi98o)  *  (EXCH,9 8o/EXCHt)
where  1980  denotes  a base  year.
Exchange  Rate  Policy
30.  Under the existing  exchange  rate system,  in operation  since  August
1988, the Dominican  peso is pegged  to the dollar.  There is, therefore,  a
strong  likelihood  for  the  peso  to become  overvalued  due to increasing  domestic
inflation.  The  government is  showing, and  has  shown  in  the  past,
unwillingness  to devalue in the face of increasing  rates of inflation. An
overvalued  exchange  rate  acts just  like  a tax  on exports,  leading  to  declines
in production  and exports.  To illustrate  the importance  of exchange  rate
policies  on the  coffee  subsector  the following  simulation  was  performed  using
the  partial  equilibrium  model  of the  Dominican  coffee  sector. It  was  assumed
that the real exchange  rate appreciates  by 10% in 1990 and remains  at this
level  until  the year 2000.  1/  The base scenario  for the simulation  is the
case  where  the  real  exchange  rate  stays  at its  1988  level. Given  the  10%  one-
shot appreciation,  coffee production  declines  by 8Z by the year 2000 as
compared  to the base scenario;  which is equivalent  to a decline  of 13X as
1/  That is,  the  real  exchange  rate  is  overvalued  by 10%  as compared  to  the
1988  real  exchange  rate.- 23 -
compared  to its 1988 level.  The loss of export  market shares  by African
exporters  of primary  products  such  as coffee, largely because of
overvalued  currencies,  is a strong  pointer  to the dangers  of  such  policies.
Liberalization  of exchange  rate markets  is the only  sure  way to  avoid  over-
or under-valuation  of currencies.- 24 -
IV.  PROJECTIONS  OF PRODUCTION  AND  EXPORTS  UNDER  DIFFERENT  SCENARIOS
31.  In this section,  the  results  of simulations  with a small  econometric
model of the coffee sector in the Dominican  Republic  are reported.  The
purpose of  the simulations  was  to estimate production  and exports under
different scenarios incorporating  some of the policy changes recommended
above. The  model  can  be described  by the  following  set  of equations:
(1)  DBT  f1(DBT(-l),  APP)  (behavioral)
(2) BT =  BT(-l)  +  DBT  (identity)
(3)  PD =  f2(BI,  APP,  BT)  (behavioral)
(4)  XAV  = PD + ES(-l)  -DC  (identity)
(5)  X =  f3(XAV,  APP)  (behavioral)
(6)  ES =  PD I  ES(-I)  - DC-X  = XAV  - X  (identity)
(7)  PP =  f4(WP)  (behavioral)
(8)  DC =  f5(RT,  GDP,  T,)  (behavioral)
(9)  TDC  - DC*POP  (identity)- 25  -
Note  that  if  the  International  Coffee Agreement's export quota  is
operative,  exports  become  exogenous  and the  model  is reduced  to  equations  (1),
(2),  (3),  (6),  (7),  (8)  and (9).
DBT  :  change  in  bearing  trees
pp  :  real  producer  price  for  coffee
BT  :  bearing  trees
PD  :  coffee  production
BI  :  coffee  biannual  production  cycle  equal  to PD(-l)/Pb(-2)
XAV  :  export  availability
ES  ending  stocks
DC  :  per  capita  domestic  consumption  of coffee
K  :  exports
x  :  lag  operator
WP  :  world  price
RT  d  teflated  domestic  retail  price  of coffee  (because  of  data
unavailability,  the  world  coffee  price  multiplied  by the
official  exchange  rate  and  divided  by the  Dominican  consumer
price  index  was  used).
GDP  :  real  per  capita  GDP
TDC  :  total  domestic  consumption
POP  2  population
T  :  time trend- 26 -
32.  It is  assumed  that  because  the  Dominican  Republic  has  less  than  1%  of
the global production and  exports any  change in its exports would not
influence  the  world  price. Hence,  the  world  coffee  price  is  exogenous  to this
model.
33.  The estimated  behavioral  equations  for  the  model  are the  following.
DBT =  -6.011  +  0.428  DBT (-1)  +  0.032  PP (-3)
(-3.63) (2.71)  (2.47)
. 0.016  PP (-4)  +  0.005  PP (-5)
(2.20)  (1.60)
R2 0  *.90  H :  0.153
(Note  that  the  T-statistics  are  in parentheses.)
PD =  -215.13  BI +  1.44  PP (-1)  +  7.52  BT
(-2.24)  (2.88)  (8.52)
a 2 =  0.70  D.W. :  2.209
DC =  148.4  +  DC (-1)  - 0.001  RT +  0.0002  GDP  + 1.38  T
(3.51)  (2.64)  (-4.22)  (1.04)  (2.18)
R2 =  0.85  U  :  -0.132- 27 -
X =  0.72  XAV  +  0.63 PP
(9.81)  (1.84)
R2 =  0.73  D.W.  =  1.902
34.  To perform the projections  a forecast  for the producer  price of
coffee  was derived  from  the  World  Bank's  forecast  of the  real  c.i.f.  price  for
"Other  Mild"  arabicas  1/  From that price  US¢10/lb  was subtracted  to reflect
freight,  insurance  and quality  adjustment,  thus deriving  the f.o.b.  price  of
Dominican  coffee. Taxes  were  then subtracted,  assuming  the  existing  level  of
taxation,  and exporters'  and intermediaries'  costs and profit  margins  were
also subtracted. The latter  are assumed  to be equal  to their  1987/88  level.
Finally,  the producer  price  was deflated  by the Dominican  CPI to obtain  the
real  producer  price  for  coffee.  2/
35.  Historical  data  on productiob,  exports  and tree stocks  were  obtained
from  USDA (see  Annex Table  3) while  data on the  producer  price  were obtained
from  the  Coffee  Department/SEA  in  the  Dominican  Republic  and  the  International
Coffee  Organization.  Table  4  gives  the  results for  the  production
projections. Two external  scenarios  were considered. The first  assumes  that
the  current  ICA  export  quota  agreement  holds  and  the  second  assumes  the  export
quota  agreement  is  not  renewed  after  September  1989.
1/  See  Annex  Table  5 for  world  coffee  price  projections  under  different
scenarios.
2/  In  the  projection  both  the  Dominican  exchange  rate  and  the  Dominican  CPI
are  assumed  to  be at their  1987  levels.- 28  -
Table  4:  COFFEE  PROClCTICN  PROJECTIONS  FOR  TIE DOMINICAN  RIPiULIC
Estimated Production
Without the Policy  Change  Estimated
Supply  Targeted  Production
With  Qurta  Without Quota  Elasticity  /a  Production /b  Quota  /c
…-----  ('000  bags)…----------  --------------------  ('000  bags)…--------------------
1987  855.0  855.0  - 855.0  855.0
1988  900.0  900.0  - 900.0  900.0
1989  894.6  894.6  - 909.1  911.0
1990  889.7  820.8  0.14  919.9  902.2
1991  880.0  865.9  0.19  930.0  897.4
1992  873.6  838.0  0.20  940.3  891.5
1993  870.4  832.2  0.28  950.6  894.6
1994  864.4  805.9  0.34  961.1  893.5
1995  863.6  799.6  0.42  971.6  900.4
1996  862.6  783.5  0.51  982.3  906.4
1997  860.6  724.0  0.60  993.1  912.2
1998  860.9  759.4  0.69  1,004.0  920.3
1999  859.8  748.4  0.78  1,015.1  927.0
2000  857.5  737.5  0.87  10026.3  932.3
/a  The  supply elasticity  shows  the  accumulated  percentage  response  of  production over time  to
a  1%  Increase In the  "recomended" price  paid  to  the grower.
/b The targeted  production  Is consistent  with  the projected  world coffee  Import demand
Increase of  1.1%  p.a.
/c  Estimated production under quota given a  10%  Increase In real  producer price  In  1989
and  thereafter.
Source:  IECCM,  World Bank.- 29 -
36.  It is projected  that  Dominican  coffee  production  will  decline  by  4.7%
between  1988 and 2000 under  assumptions  that the ICA quota  system  continues
and that the present.  domestic  tax system  continues  (see column  1, Table  4).
If the export  quota regime  is not renewed  in September  1989  and  export  taxes
remain  unchanged,  coffee  production  is projected  to decline  by 18.1%  over  the
projection  period  (see  column  2, Table  4).  As can be seen  from  Annex  Table  5
there is expected  to be a sharp  fall in coffee  prices  in 1990 if the export
quota  regime  is  suspended.
37.  For production  in the year 2000 to be sustained  at its 1988 level,
under the assumption  of the continuation  of the ICA export quota, it is
estimated  that a real producer  price increase  of about 5.7% is needed.  If
export  quotas  are not operative  over that period  a 31.1%  real  producer  price
increase  will  be needed.
38.  Chart 3 presents  projected  Dominican  exports  under  the two  external
scenarios--i.e.,  with and without  the ICA  export  quota  system. In the first
year after  the  abolition  of the  export  quota  regime,  exports  increase  to  about
700,000  bags  mainly  due to the  release  of stocks  accumulated  during  the  quota
years.  However,  after  the initial  jump,  exports  decline  as the  lower  coffee
prices  cause  production  to decline.
39.  If  the ICA  export quota system continues after 1990, Dominican
exports are seen to increase  up to year 1995.  However,  after 1995, the
Dominican  Republic  will not be able to fulfill  its  export  quota. Projecting
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670,000  bags  by the  year 2000.  In the  year  2000  with the  existing  policies  in
place,  export  availability  is projected  to be 632,000  bags--  indicating  that
the  quota  could be  filled only by  driving stocks to  near zero.  (The
simulations  were  based  on the  assumption  of 110,000  bags  as a reasonable  level
of working  stocks.)
40.  The  main measure  seen  as providing  an incentive  for  increased  coffee
production  in the Dominican  Republic  is reduced export taxation  and hence
increased  prices to producers.  Under the "with quota" scenario,  a  15.1%
increase  in producer  prices  will lead to an increase  in production  by about
10%  in the year 2000 (see last column of Table 4).  To achieve  a  15.1%
increase in producer  prices an average export tax reduction  of 33.3% is
required.  A  52.4% average tax reduction (28% increase  in veal producer
prices)  will be r-eded  to  achieve  the  production  target  by the  year  2000  (the
production target is  domestic consumption  plus an  export market growth
consistent  with  an increase  in  world  coffee  importr  demand  of 1.1%  p.a.).
41.  Prices in real terms fall under the "without  quota" scenario.  1/
Under this scenario  and without  any change  in producer  price  policy  the gap
between targeted  production  and actual  production  is about  39% by the year
2000.  Real  producer  prices  would  have to increase  by about  50%  over  what  they
would otherwise  be in order to achieve  the targeted  production  by the year
2000. For  producer prices to  increase  by  50% export taxes have to be
1/  On the  average  real  producer  prices  are  expected  to  fall  about  25%  during
the  first  five  years  after  the  suspension  of the  quota  scheme,  but they
would  increase  after  that  time.- 32 -
abolished. Under  the "without  quota"  scenario,  if production  is to remain  at
its present  1988/89  level  by the year 2000,  producer  prices  have to increase
by  31%.  For  a  31%  increase, a  68.6% average export tax  decrease is
required.  The implications  of these scenarios  for export  tax revenues  and
government  revenue  can  be seen  in  Table  3.
Conclusions
42.  Coffee is an  important export crop for  the Dominican Republic,
accounting  for an average  of 11% of total  exports  by value  over the 1982-84
period.  However, coffee  growing in  the  Dominican Republic has  been
characterized  by low  yields  and stagnant  production  and exports  over the  last
ten  years  or so.  The low  and stagnant  yields  (low-yielding  by comparison  with
newer  varieties)  are  a direct  result  of the  very  old  age  of the  coffee  trees,
the low planting  density  and the poor husbandry.  If the current  policies
affecting the  coffee subsector continue it  is very  likely that coffee
production  and  exports  will  decline. From  field  observation  it  was  also  found
that, despite the good genetic  qualities  of the coffee  trees grown in the
Dominican  Republic,  the quality  of the coffee  beans  produced  is low  due to
inappropriate  processing. The country  has been having  difficulty  in filling
its export  quota  under the International  Coffee  Agreement. It now  faces  the
possibility  of losing  export  quota  share  and  therefore  loss  of the  high-priced
markets.- 33  -
43.  The two  main recommendations  of a mission  from  which  this report  has
been taken  were:
(i)  Coffee  washing  stations  should  be established  in order  to
improve  the  quality  and  marketability  of the  coffee  beans.
(ii)  A  policy of  real  producer price increases should be
adopted  to  avoid  the  prospective decline in  coffee
production.
44.  The establishment  of coffee  washing  stations  was recommended  because
of the higher  price that washed  coffees  can fetch  on world  markets  and the
recent  shift  in world  demand  towards  better  quality  types  of coffee. Because
of this recent trend in world coffee  demand,  price premia  for high quality
washed  coffee  over  other  coffees  have  been  increasing  in  recent  years.
45.  This  report  is  concerned mostly with  the  second of  the  two
recommendations.  It  reports the  results of  simulations  with a  small
econometric  model of the Dominican coffee sector which show that coffee
production  will  decline  if  current  policies  continue. Simulations  showed  that
the  decline  would  be much steeper  if the International  Coffee  Agreement  (ICA)
export  quota agreement  is not renewed in September  of 1989.  Reductions  in
export taxes to increase  producer prices in real terms were evaluated  in
simulations  of the  model  with and  without  the  export  quota. Tax  cuts  seem  to
be crucial  if the  export  quota  system  is  not  renewed. Under  the  without-quota
scenario  and  without  tax cuts,  real producer  prices  would fall significantly- 34  -
(by  about  30Z in  the  first  year  and by 15-20Z  over  the  following  three  years);
under these  circumstances  farmers  would be likely  to become  disinterested  in
growing  coffee.
46.  Other model results  suggest  that:  (i) if the ICA is continued,  an
export tax cut of 52% would achieve the desired  production  level (to meet
projected  quota  and  non-quota  export  demand)  by the  year  2000;  and (ii)  if  the
ICA is  discontinued,  the  elimination  of export  tax  is required  to  achieve  the
desired production  level  by year 2000.  (It should  be noted that the above
calculations  were made under the assumption  that the tax rates would be
adjusted  to  avoid  bracket-creep  prnblems.)- 35  -
ANNEX  TABLES- 36 -
Annex  Table  1:  A  COMPARISON  OF UNIT  VALUES  OF EXPORTS  BY ICA  MEMBERS
Coffee  Year
Exporting  Members  1982/83  1983/84  1984/85  1985/86
---------------- US/lb…--------------
Colombian  Milds
Colombia  128.25  131.75  132.81  184.75
Kenya  129.67  141.40  145.39  170.38
Other  Milds
Costa  Rica  121.95  134.13  133.46  182.91
Dominican  Republic  117.05  130.03  127.71  164.41
El Salvador  123.26  135.40  129.43  170.14
Guatemala  121.12  131.01  130.12  160.57
Honduras  118.80  127.40  132.20  176.55
Mexico  126.21  139.72  135.26  179.10
Nicaragua  129.57  133.39  135.18  151.73
Papua  New  Guinea  118.80  129.53  132.73  167.87
Source: International  Coffee  Organization  (ICO).- 37  -
Annex  Table  2:  SIZE  OF COFFEE  FARMS  IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC
Size  Number  Surface  Area
(in  Tareas*)  of Farms  % of Farms  (in  Tareas)  X of Area
1-9  29,911  41.9  108,807  4.5
10-19  12,386  171.4  178,326  ,.3
20-49  16,346  23.0  553,504  22.8
50-99  8,223  11.6  606,383  25.0
100-199  3,144  4.4  443,903  18.3
200-299  701  1.0  176,908  7.3
more  than  300  524  0.'  360,587  14.8
Total  71,235  100.0  2,428,418  100.0
i  15.92  tareas  =  1  ha.
Source: Seventh  (VII)  National  Agricultural  Census  (1981)
Coffee  Department/SEA.- 38  -
Annex Table  3:  MaU&, ISM  POPUATION  aMD PaOmUxIOu.  1960/61-1916/$g
IAl  IN 1.000 MA.  TERS  IN 1.000.000  AND
PROOUCTION  It 1o000  So KILO DM5
D"einning  Marketinq  Area  Area  Bearing  Non-ose,  Total  Arabies  Robusta  Other  Total  Yield
Month  Year  Planted  Harvested  Tr%es  Troes  treoo  Prod.  Prod.  Prod.  Prod.  Kg/a
Dominican  Rep.  July
1960/l  *5  60  76  6  $2  550  0  0  550  412
1961/62  as  so  79  6  Is  649  0  0  649  467
1962/63  6s  60  $I  6  87  625  0  0  625  469
1963/64  90  a5  82  7  69  755  0  0  755  533
1964/65  90  65  64  7  91  796  0  0  7S8  535
1965/66  90  65  65  6  93  '0P  0  0  709  S'o
1966/67  95  90  *6  9  95  576  0  0  576  364
1967/66  95  90  so  9  97  706  0  0  706  471
1968/69  95  90  90  9  99  602  0  0  602  401
1969/70  100  95  93  9  102  795  0  0  795  502
1970/71  100  95  96  9  107  653  0  0  "53  539
1971/72  t00  95  96  9  105  768  0  0  760  485
1972/73  110  100  100  7  107  767  0  0  767  460
1973/74  110  100  100  10  110  653  0  0  653  512
1974/75  110  100  100  10  110  6'3  0  0  68'  530
1975/76  120  110  110  10  120  1.054  0  0  1,054  575
1976/77  120  110  110  10  120  733  0  0  733  400
1977/76  120  110  110  10  120  1,041  0  0  i,041  56$
197$/79  120  110  110  10  120  695  0  0  695  379
1979/80  120  110  114  11  125  1,009  0  0  1.009  S50
1980/61  120  110  119  11  130  1.112  0  0  1.112  606
1981/62  120  110  123  12  135  649  1  0  6S9  464
19826/3  120  110  133  12  145  997  3  0  1.000  545
1983/84  122  114  137  13  150  602  6  t  810  426
1964/85  122  116  140  13  153  096  13  0  909  470
19$5/66  122  116  140  13  153  695  15  0  710  367
1966/87  116  116  135  12  147  653  2  0  a5s  442
1967/66  115  110  130  13  143  $98  2  0  900  491
1960/89  115  110  130  13  143  898  2  0  900  491
corre  SUPPLY 6  DISSRhBID  OM 1960/61-1967/88
fiN  TEOUSANOS  Or  60 KILOW5R  MU)
Marketing  o  gin-  Pro-  I.-  Total  Domestic  Dean  Roosted  Soluble  Total  Ivding
Year  nin  duction  ports  S/D  Use  Exports  Ground  Exports  Exports  Stocks
Stocks  Exports
Dominican  Rep.  1960/61  50  550  0  600  195  329  0  0  329  76
1961/62  76  649  0  72S  201  459  0  0  459  65
1962/63  65  625  0  690  200  423  0  0  423  S5
1963/64  59  755  0  $14  214  536  0  0  536  64
1964/65  64  756  0  622  221  522  0  0  522  79
1965/66  79  709  0  766  228  421  0  0  421  139
1966/67  131  576  0  715  235  394  0  0  394  s6
1967/60  66  706  0  792  242  445  0  0  445  105
1960/69  105  602  0  707  249  338  0  0  338  120
1969/70  120  795  0  915  257  466  35  0  521  137
1970/71  137  853  0  990  265  441  29  0  470  255
1971/72  255  766  0  1,023  273  391  46  0  439  311
1972/73  311  767  0  1,078  281  635  37  0  672  1as
1973/74  125  653  0  978  290  527  76  0  603  as
1974/75  85  603  0  966  298  415  96  0  511  13S
1975/76  159  1,054  0  1,213  265  731  95  0  a26  102
1976/77  102  733  0  835  246  377  116  0  495  S4
1977/70  94  1,041  0  1,135  270  730  76  0  606  S7
1978/79  57  695  0  752  280  306  11  0  424  46
1979/80  46  1,009  0  1,057  205  378  64  0  662  1t0
1900/61  110  1,112  0  1,222  290  501  62  0  563  169
1981/82  369  650  0  1,219  295  506  95  0  601  323
1982/63  323  1,000  0  1.323  300  526  0  0  526  497
1983/64  497  $10  0  1.307  302  528  1  1  530  475
1964/65  475  909  0  1,384  305  600  S  3  606  471
1985/06  471  710  0  1,181  295  531  5  0  536  390
19$6/87  350  655  0  1,205  300  612  0  0  612  293
1987/86  293.  900  0  1,193  310  560  0  0  560  323
1986/89  323  900  0  1,223  316  450  0  0  450  459- 39  -
Annex  Table  4:  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  COFFEE  EXPORTS  TO ICA  MEMBERS  AND
NON-MEMBERS
Exports
To  ICA  To  non-
Crop  Year  Total  Members  members
of ICA
Starting
1  July  -------------- ('000  bags)--------------
1968/69  338  338  0
1969/70  516  506  10
1971/71  471  443  28
1971/72  437  357  80
1972/73  657  616  41
1973/74  558  467  91
1974/75  485  373  112
1975/76  814  697  117
1976/77  482  374  108
1977/78  799  733  66
1978/79  425  306  119
1979/80  664  574  90
1980/81  474  416  58
1981/82  610  503  107
1982/83  509  509  0
1983/84  529  529  0
1984/85  542  510  32
1985/86*  569  546  23
Source: ICO.
*  Estimated.- 40 -
Annex Table 5:  PROJECTED PRICES a/ UNDER ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS
Base  Case
High GDP Growth  Lower GDP Growth  Without  Quotas
Year  Base Case  and Lower Quotas  and Higher Quotas  from 1990
(with quotas)
-----------------------------(1987 US¢/kg)…--------------------------…
1989  301 (137) b/  303 (138)  300 (136)  301 (137)
1990  303 (137)  307 (139)  298 (135)  216  (98)
1995  294 (133)  315 (143)  252 (114)  271 (123)
2000  294 (134)  335 (152)  240 (109)  304 (138)
a/  ICO "Other Milds" Indicator Price in 1987 prices.
b/  Figures in brackets are US¢/lb.
Source:  IECCM, World Bank, Report 814/88, Price Prospects for Major Primary
Commodities, November, 1988.- 41 -
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